Advance Copy, Air Force Magazine Editorial

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-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Advance Copy, Air Force Magazine EditorialDate: Mon, 07 Jan 2008 22:41:56 -0800From: Brig Gen R. Clements USAF ret <p38bob@deepwell. com>Reply-To: p38bob@deepwell. comOrganization: USAF retiredTo: BG Bob Clements USAF ret<p38bob@deepwell. com>


LTG Brett Dula USAF ret forwarded:Advance CopyAir Force Magazine EditorialJanuary 2008 IssueCatastrophic FailureWashington's apathy toward USAF's geriatric fleet comes close to outrightnegligence.Robert S. DudneyEditor in ChiefWashington, D.C., Dec. 28, 2007 IT WAS a chilling event. The aged F-15C, flying a peacetime mission,broke up without warning, even though the aircraft had not been violentlymaneuvering. The pilot was forced to eject at high speed. These words do not refer to the recent F-15 crackup above Missouri(see "Washington Watch: The F-15 Incident," p. 8). No, the mishap spoken ofhere occurred in 2002 over the Gulf of Mexico. The doomed F-15C was flyingat 24,000 feet when part of its tail broke off. Maj. James A. Duricy punchedout at 900 mph and was killed. Investigators said the tail had corroded overthe years. The fighter had gotten old. That, please note, was six years ago. The Nov. 2 mishap in Missourimight be sobering (USAF cited a "catastrophic structural failure" andgrounded many F-15s) but it certainly was not new. USAF has been warningabout aging aircraft for many years. Evidently, the warnings haven't registered. National leaders (be theyin the White House, Defense Department, or Congress) have failed to addressthe issue in any truly definitive way. Indeed, Washington's apathy towardUSAF's geriatric fleet comes close to outright negligence. The Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, reports the averageage of an Air Force aircraft in 1973 was eight years but today is 24 yearsand headed toward 26.5 years in 2012. The problem goes well beyond the F-15to include most of the major aircraft types - - bombers, tankers, andtransports no less than fighters. USAF's 505 KC-135 refueling tankers average more than 46 years of age.Many C-130 transports are grounded due to poor reliability and concern fortheir in-flight safety. C-5A cargo aircraft have low availability because offrequent maintenance. The roots of the problem are many and tangled, but no one doubts thatthings began to go off the rails during the so-called "procurement holiday"of the 1990s. Problems first emerged in the 1989-93 presidency of George H. W. Bush.In his four years as Pentagon chief, Dick Cheney (now Vice President Cheney)curtailed USAF's F-15 program, postponed the F-22 fighter, terminated theB-2 bomber at only 20 aircraft (later raised to 21), and cut the C-17airlifter. A get-well aircraft modernization was supposed to begin in the late1990s, but it was again delayed by a widespread post-Cold War desire to reapa "peace dividend" by cutting defense spending. The Clinton Administrationbought a few F-15s and F-16s for attrition reserve, but it also reduced theplanned F-22 program from 648 to 339 aircraft and further delayed it. When President George W. Bush arrived in 2001, USAF was poised for along-deferred fleet recapitalization. Then, Bush's Defense Secretary DonaldH. Rumsfeld, enamored of military transformation, restrained aircraftmodernization once more. After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, wars inAfghanistan and Iraq began to soak up defense dollars. Today, more than 800 aircraft (14 percent of the USAF fleet) aregrounded or operating under various flight restrictions. Older fighters inthe near future won't be up to fighting modern air defenses or modernfighters. The Air Force is "going out of business," said Wynne. He added, "Atsome time in the future, [aircraft] will simply rust out, age out, fall outof the sky." Indeed, it is already happening. No one can claim there was not fair warning of the danger. As far backas 1996, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, noted "the term‘aging aircraft' takes on a new significance when [you are] keeping fightersin the inventory 25 to 30 years." In 1999, Gen. Richard E. Hawley, head of Air Combat Command, observedthat, "We are flying the oldest fleet of airplanes that the Air Force hasever operated. ... Old airplanes break in new ways. ... The older it gets,the less predictable it gets." Fogleman's successor, Gen. Michael E. Ryan, in 2000 expressed deepconcern about fleet age and the high cost of finding the proper kinds ofspare parts in sufficient numbers to support readiness. In 2005, near the end of his tour as Chief of Staff, Gen. John P.Jumper warned, "The thing that ... worries me the most is the [stunted]recapitalization of our force. ... We are now facing problems with airplanesthat we have never seen before." What is to be done? Some Air Force officials suggest that, at thislate stage, the service cannot truly solve the problem but rather engage indamage limitation. This would entail two basic moves, both of which aresimple but not easy. They are: Expand procurement. Top Air Force officials have declared that, toproperly fund the hardware accounts, service spending must rise by at least$20 billion per year for at least the next six years and probably for longerthan that. New aircraft would enter the inventory at an accelerated pace. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF Chief of Staff, has made replacing theaged KC-135 tanker his highest priority. USAF seeks 381 F-22s (not the 183that has been allowed by the Pentagon) and 1,763 F-35s. These fighters wouldreplace many old F-15s, F-16s, F-117s, and A-10s. Dump old airplanes. Keeping the old, flying clunkers is amoney-burner, given their high maintenance and upgrade costs. The Air Forcewants to mothball more of the old B-52 bombers, KC-135E tankers, and C-130Elifters. This will require the cooperation of Congress which, mostly forparochial reasons, barred many such retirements from local bases. Moseleysaid such restrictions force him to retain airplanes that can neither flynor fight but which nevertheless require regular and expensive upkeep. In both areas, the Air Force will have to do some high-stepping. Thereis no assurance of success even then. Without some dramatic change in Washington, USAF may have no choicebut to retrench, lower its expectations, and accept higher risk in meetingits obligations. Then, the Air Force really would be going out of business,at least in the sense to which we all have become accustomed. ###