Veteran Issues Digest Number 1709

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Messages In This Digest (4 Messages)

1. Ref Complaint targets VA psych staff From: Colonel Dan 2. Plan to politicize JAG promotions blocked From: Colonel Dan 3. Strategy that is making Iraq safer was snubbed for years From: Colonel Dan 4. Veteran's radio Show Today, online 6:30 to 8:30 PM From: Colonel Dan
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Messages

1. Ref Complaint targets VA psych staff

Posted by: "Colonel Dan" colonel-dan@sbcglobal.net coloneldan1

Wed Dec 19, 2007 6:34 am (PST)

Note: From ColonelDan.. ..How many of the VA's mental health Staff are of
Foreign birth... with no concept of a soldier's or American's life style.
How many are Muslim?
Giving counseling to a veteran on marital issues, alcohol or even smoking?
I have heard from veterans that were at the end of their rope, going to a
VA mental health counselor for help with PTSD, or depression, etc and
spending most of their time being talked into taking patches, etc to stop
smoking.

How many are unlicensed through out the VA system? Why don't the VA also
use more blood tests to check a veteran's cytokine profile?

From: JEREBEERY@aol. com [mailto:JEREBEERY@aol. com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2007 9:43 PM
To: ColonelDan
Subject: Complaint targets VA psych staff

Complaint targets VA psych staff

Treatment by unlicensed psychologists doesn't affect patient care at Haley,
the VA says.

http://www.sptimes. com/2007/ 12/04/Hillsborou gh/Complaint_ targets_VA_ .shtml

By WILLIAM R. LEVESQUE, Times Staff Writer
Published December 4, 2007
TAMPA - Providing the very best mental health care to soldiers returning
from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is one of the highest priorities for the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
But at the nation's busiest VA hospital, the James A. Haley VA Medical
Center in Tampa, the most-troubled and vulnerable veterans are often treated
by the least-experienced psychologists, according to a complaint to the
state.
About 12 of Haley's 34 psychologists - more than a third - are unlicensed
and receive little if any direct supervision, according to a complaint filed
Nov. 29 with the Florida Board of Psychology.
The VA disagrees with the complaint's figure, saying just nine are
unlicensed.
The complaint, filed by Haley psychologist Brian Nussbaum, said some of
these psychologists still use the title of either "psychologist" or
"clinical psychologist" with patients.
If true, that would violate state law.
In an interview on Monday, Nussbaum said three of the four psychologists
working in Haley's Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Clinic are unlicensed.
Nussbaum is the only licensed psychologist in the clinic.
And he said Haley's suicide-prevention coordinator also is an unlicensed
psychologist.
Nussbaum, who agreed to an interview after the St. Petersburg Times obtained
a copy of his complaint, said he fears patient care is endangered by this
inexperience.
Unlicensed psychologists, he said, are typically people who have recently
obtained their psychology doctorate and have far less clinical experience
than their licensed counterparts.
"I have nothing to gain by doing this and everything to lose," he said. "The
majority of mental health services provided to our newest generation of
veterans is being provided by our least-experienced staff."
VA officials denied that patient care is impacted and said that all
unlicensed psychologists receive ample supervision and are on track to
receive their licenses in the future.
Florida and federal law allows unlicensed psychologists to work as long as
they receive constant supervision, the VA and state said.
Regional VA spokesman John Pickens said the VA places the highest priority
on veteran mental health treatment and that unlicensed psychologists do
receive constant supervision.
"I'm fearful these sorts of allegations are going to cause veterans to think
that the care we provide is less than what they deserve," said Pickens. "The
VA at Tampa and nationally has done a very good job treating vets."
Nussbaum said what is happening at Haley is not the norm. But a national VA
spokesman did not return a call asking about VA hiring policy.
At the Bay Pines VA Medical Center in St. Petersburg, which also operates a
PTSD clinic, none of the hospital's 22 psychologists are unlicensed, said
Pickens.
Some veteran advocates questioned the practice of relying heavily on
unlicensed psychologists at a time when the numbers of veterans requiring
mental health treatment is increasing.
"How would you feel going to the airport and getting on an airplane and
finding out the pilot didn't have a license?" said Michael O'Rourke, an
assistant director of veteran health policy with Veterans of Foreign Wars.
"Experience counts."
To obtain a state license, the state says an applicant must complete 2,000
hours of supervised clinical work, which must include a supervisor reviewing
their notes.
In addition, the state says applicants must have two hours of direct
supervision each week with a licensed psychologist. At least one hour must
be face-to-face, rather than over the phone.
"For many of these unlicensed psychologists, there is no face-to-face
supervision, " Nussbaum's letter said. "For others, there is sporadic
supervision, clearly not meeting the required two hours per week."
In his complaint, Nussbaum said the Haley doctor who supervises most of the
unlicensed people, Arthur Rosenblatt, cannot provide adequate oversight.
Rosenblatt could not be reached to comment.
"It is not possible for him to solely provide the supervision of such a
large quantity of trainees in addition to his many other duties, especially
since many of these staff are placed in outlying clinics 45-plus miles away
(where they function independently) and rarely, if ever, see one another
face-to-face, " Nussbaum's letter said.
Complaints to the Board of Psychology, a division of the Florida Department
of Health, are confidential and the department won't comment on or confirm a
pending complaint.
The state investigates such complaints and can take a range of actions, from
suspending a license to levying a fine against anyone accused of misconduct.

But it was unclear Monday whether the state has jurisdiction over the VA.
Nussbaum would not speculate about why he thinks Haley has hired so many
unlicensed practitioners. O'Rourke at the VFW said the VA is struggling to
find qualified mental health personnel.
The VA employs 10,000 mental health professionals nationally, up 15 percent
since 2003.
Nussbaum said veterans deserve care from the most-experienced professionals
available.
Unlicensed psychologists "often lack the specialized skills and experience
that this extremely sensitive population of veterans often requires,"
Nussbaum said. "They've been in combat. Developing a strong, empathetic
relationship with them is essential.
"That's something not easily taught in a class," he said. "It takes
experience."
Times staff writer William R. Levesque can be reached at (813) 226-3436 or
<mailto:levesque@ sptimes.% 3C/p%3E%3Cp% 3E%3Cp%3E> levesque@sptimes.
<mailto:levesque@ sptimes.% 3C/p%3E%3Cp% 3E%3Cp%3E>
How to get help
Veterans who are suicidal or have concerns about other mental health issues
can call the VA at 1-800-273-TALK (8255).
2. Plan to politicize JAG promotions blocked

Posted by: "Colonel Dan" colonel-dan@sbcglobal.net coloneldan1

Wed Dec 19, 2007 6:42 am (PST)


Plan to politicize JAG promotions blocked

By Rick <mailto:rmaze@atpco. com?subject=Question from ArmyTimes.com reader>
Maze - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Dec 19, 2007
http://www.armytime s.com/news/ 2007/12/military _jag_flap_ 071218w/

An attempt within the Pentagon to politicize promotions for military judge
advocates general appears to have been blocked after protests from military
lawyers and threats from key lawmakers.

The plan, which called for "coordination" with the civilian general counsels
of the services and the Defense Department for the promotion of any JAG
officers, had been circulated in the Pentagon since November but ran into a
serious roadblock Tuesday when key members of Congress learned about the
details.

For promotions to O-6 and below, the proposed policy required coordination
with the chief civilian lawyer of each service, the service general counsel.
For promotions to flag and general officer rank, the proposal called for
coordination with the Defense Department general counsel.

DoD General Counsel William Haynes had planned to hold a meeting this Friday
with the service judge advocates general to discuss the proposal, but
sources in the Pentagon and in Congress said if a meeting is held at all, it
will be to try to heal the wounds the proposal caused.

"This is one of the dumbest ideas I have ever heard come out of the DoD
general counsel," said Rep. Steve Buyer, R-Ind., an Army Reserve JAG officer
and former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on
military personnel.

"It is dead on arrival. If they enact the policy, and it appears they can, I
promise we will stop it."

Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice and a
senior partner at Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell, said the proposal clearly
was an attempt to stifle military lawyers who have criticized Bush
administration policies on torture and the rights of detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

"Against the backdrop of the events of the last several years, it's hard to
see this as anything other than payback for the independence of the JAG
corps," Fidell said. "I'm talking about the torture memos [and] the feisty
independence that many JAGs have displayed over the last several years."

Another military lawyer in Congress, Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, R-S.C., said
the Pentagon initiative concerns him because it could lead military lawyers
to be "looking over their shoulders" when proving legal advice to
commanders.

"I do not want to interfere with legal advice given to commanders and
military personnel," said Graham, an Air Force Reserve judge advocate.
"Having a military lawyer serve two masters is a bad thing."

Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., chairman of the Senate Armed Services personnel
subcommittee, said, he hopes the Pentagon realizes it cannot add a new
wrinkle to getting promoted without congressional oversight.

"Whatever change they may propose is subject to approval by the Senate Armed
Services Committee," he said.

The Armed Services Committee not only has the power to rewrite promotion law
but also is responsible for approving the promotions of every military
officer in the grades of O-4 and above. If displeased, it could bring all
promotions to a screeching halt.

A Nelson aide said a few phone calls appeared to do the trick. "I believe we
have already stopped it," said the aide, who asked not to be identified.

3. Strategy that is making Iraq safer was snubbed for years

Posted by: "Colonel Dan" colonel-dan@sbcglobal.net coloneldan1

Wed Dec 19, 2007 7:03 am (PST)

Note: It has been known and proven for centuries.. when you go to war, It
is "Boots on the ground" that wins them
and too many YES MEN get people killed

<http://www.usatoday .com/news/ military/ 2007-12-18- iraqstrategy_ N.htm>
http://www.usatoday .com/news/ military/ 2007-12-18- iraqstrategy_ N.htm

By Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY
When Army Capt. Jeremy Gwinn's company patrolled Baghdad in 2005, the
approach toward roadside bombs was simple: avoid them or die.

By early 2006, that strategy had begun to shift: Instead of hunting for the
bombs, the soldiers hunted for bombmakers. "We started to know a lot of
people in the community and develop contacts," recalls Gwinn, now a major.
"There was a noticeable change . in the way we were doing things."

TROOPS: Patrols Help revive neighborhoods
http://www.usatoday .com/news/ military/ 2007-12-18- ied-side_ N.htm

Today, that change has swept across Iraq, and attacks using improvised
explosive devices, or IEDs, have declined steadily for eight months.
Casualties from the bombs are at their lowest point since 2003, the first
year of the war. Troops have seized twice as many weapons caches this year
as they did all of last.

"Just about every single night, we are identifying and engaging one or more
cells caught in the act of planting IEDs," Gen. David Petraeus, head of U.S.
forces in Iraq, said in an interview.

Efforts to stop IEDs by targeting the insurgent networks that finance, build
and plant the bombs showed results only after the Bush administration
adopted a broader counterinsurgency strategy this year - and sent 30,000
more troops to Iraq to support it.

But a USA TODAY investigation shows that the strategy now used to defeat the
bombmaking networks and stabilize Iraq was ignored or rejected for years by
key decision-makers. As early as 2004, when roadside bombs already were
killing scores of troops, a top military consultant invited to address two
dozen generals offered a "strategic alternative" for beating the insurgency
and IEDs.

That plan and others mirroring the counterinsurgency blueprint that the
Pentagon now hails as a success were pitched repeatedly in memos and
presentations during the following two years, at meetings that included
then-Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby.

The core of the strategy: Clear insurgents from key areas and provide
security to win over Iraqis, who would respond by helping U.S. forces break
IED networks and defeat the insurgency.

Bush administration officials, however, remained wedded to the idea that
training the Iraqi army and leaving the country would suffice. Officials,
including Cheney, insisted the insurgency was dying. Those pronouncements
delayed the Pentagon from embracing new plans to stop IEDs and investing in
better armored vehicles that allow troops to patrol more freely, documents
and interviews show.

Even after the Pentagon began committing substantial resources to combat
IEDs, USA TODAY found, its spending focused mostly on high-tech devices with
limited utility. Some silver-bullet solutions, such as microwave beams
designed to destroy IEDs before they blew up, never worked.

By the time the Pentagon moved to a counterinsurgency strategy at the end of
last year, the bombs had been the top killer of U.S. troops for three years,
claiming more than 1,160 lives. To date, they are responsible for more than
60% of combat deaths.

"What's astounding is how long we spent not applying traditional
counterinsurgency principles to fighting what obviously was an insurgency,"
says Fred Kagan, a military analyst at the American Enterprise Institute and
former West Point instructor. "It's not that we've solved the IED problem,
per se. It's that we've begun to have success in defeating the insurgents."

Andrew Krepinevich, the consultant who addressed the generals in 2004 and
met with Libby in 2005, says the price of that failure was profound.

"One is the human cost, both in terms of the suffering of Iraqis and the
Americans killed and wounded," he says. "Second is the material cost. And
third is the failure to accomplish the mission."

Krepinevich, who has advised several secretaries of Defense and the former
U.S. ambassador to Iraq, says "the American military is on the clock in this
war, and the American people, in a sense, gave the administration several
years to make progress. Those years, to a significant extent, were wasted."

White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe says the administration weighed all
strategy options and made "appropriate decisions."

"Throughout the war, many people have come forward with various suggestions
and ideas, from 'more troops' to 'get out now,' " he says. "The president
has listened to the commanders on the ground and the Defense Department."

Rumsfeld declined to comment.

'This mind-set of the short war'

Rumsfeld and other civilian and uniformed war planners "had this mind-set of
the short war, a liberation vs. an occupation," says retired Marine general
Anthony Zinni, former chief of U.S. Central Command.

He says many combat commanders were frustrated by the Pentagon's failure to
recognize that a force larger than the 120,000 U.S. ground troops in the
initial invasion was needed to secure the country - and its ammunition
dumps, which held the explosives that insurgents continue to use to build
IEDs.

Officials also failed to send the right kind of vehicles.

In July, USA TODAY reported that until 2006, the Pentagon balked at pleas
from battlefield commanders to send safer armor to protect U.S. troops from
IEDs. The armored vehicles, called Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles,
or MRAPs, weren't fully embraced by the Pentagon until mid-2007, when
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Rumsfeld's successor, made them his top
procurement priority.

Today, 11,941 MRAPs have been ordered, and about 1,200 of those are being
used by troops in Iraq. "These are a vast improvement in terms of
protection," Petraeus says.

Petraeus cites other crucial steps - among them the 30,000-troop "surge" -
that have led to a decline in violence and a better chance to secure the
country. Most are key components of the strategy favored by Krepinevich and
others during the first months of the war.

Petraeus won't discuss why the Bush administration didn't pursue a
counterinsurgency strategy earlier. Rather, he focuses on what's happening
now - and its apparent successes. "It's not just the additional forces. It's
also how they are used," Petraeus says. "The deployment of our forces and
Iraqi forces into the neighborhoods, to the areas where the bad guys are
located, is key. You have to live with the population to help secure it. "

He says that "in the past couple of months, we have been finding greater
than 50% of the IEDs (before they go off), which is a first."

Zinni credits Petraeus with shifting U.S. fortunes. "It's about Americans
being out there and being visible, providing security, building confidence
among the people," he says. "It's paying off."

No 'coherent strategy'

For years, Rumsfeld and other Pentagon officials resisted just such an
approach. Although generals such as Petraeus put their theories into action
on a small scale in Iraq as early as 2003, the military still lacked a
detailed, nationwide plan for battling the insurgency.

In September 2004, 18 months into the war, Krepinevich flew to Nashville at
the invitation of top generals. Krepinevich, then 54, wore a jacket and tie;
except for the spouses many generals brought to the session, he was one of
few in the hotel conference room not in uniform. It added to his
trepidation.

Krepinevich had the credentials: A graduate of West Point, he had been an
officer for 20 years and now ran the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, an independent Washington think tank. What he didn't have was
the experience: He hadn't been to Iraq. Moreover, he was about to tell the
generals that the Pentagon's approach to the war made no sense.

He would be embarrassed if they told him he didn't understand the situation
in Iraq, he recalls thinking. But if they agreed with his assessment, it
meant trouble for U.S. efforts to secure the country.

"It is difficult to discern a coherent U.S. strategy for defeating the
insurgency," he told them. The solution: "Win the hearts and minds, and .
deny insurgents easy access to the population, thereby enhancing
intelligence on the enemy."

Krepinevich' s call for a new direction drew no criticism. "It told me they
didn't have an approach" for winning the war, he says.

Retired Army major general Paul Eaton, who was at the meeting and had been
directing the training of Iraqi forces, said Krepinevich "was saying what
had become increasingly obvious to many of us."

"What we had was a secretary of Defense who denied (the insurgency existed)
. and the senior leadership of the Army would not challenge him," Eaton
says. "But Krepinevich could. A lot of us were thinking, 'He gets it; maybe
he can reach some of the leadership.' "

Krepinevich would become one of several analysts and retired military
officers who helped develop the counterinsurgency strategies. But their
ideas wouldn't gain footing with decision-makers for years.

Meantime, the Pentagon had spent billions of dollars on technology to detect
or defeat IEDs.

The high-tech solutions

Most of the money went toward "jammers" - devices to block the electronic
signals used to detonate IEDs by remote control. Jammers remain one of the
more successful electronic IED countermeasures. As insurgents shifted to new
types of detonators, new jammers were introduced. This year, the Pentagon
has spent $2 billion on them.

Other high-tech initiatives in the IED fight have failed entirely:

.Forerunner, a remote-controlled truck, was to be driven ahead of convoys to
detect IEDs. It was scrapped after almost $7 million in spending. It didn't
work.

.BlowTorch was designed to use microwaves to fry the circuitry in IEDs from
afar. It was abandoned after more than $8 million was invested. It didn't
work either.

Defense officials acknowledged that technology alone would not defeat IEDs,
but spending soared. In 2006, the Pentagon's counter-IED office, the Joint
IED Defeat Organization, spent 67% of its $3.5 billion budget on jammers and
other technology to "defeat the device."

But IED deaths kept rising.

Retired Army general Montgomery Meigs, who took over the IED office at the
end of 2005 and led it until this month, began pushing for a new focus in
2006. "We made attacking the network No. 1" on the priority list, he says.

Krepinevich had continued to push the same message. In an Aug. 23, 2005,
memo to Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army's chief of staff, Krepinevich warned
that technology wasn't the answer.

Instead, as Krepinevich says today, U.S. forces needed to provide "enduring"
security that would make it "risky for people to go out and plant" IEDs.
"You needed to think not just about technology; you needed to think about
how you defeated the overall problem. The key . was intelligence. "

Krepinevich says he told that to Libby, Cheney's chief of staff, during a
July 2005 meeting in Libby's office. In May, just two months earlier, Cheney
had declared that the Iraqi insurgency was in "its last throes." Now,
Krepinevich was suggesting the administration refocus its approach around
that insurgency. Libby "took it all in and asked a few questions,"
Krepinevich recalls, but that was it.

Krepinevich says the only meaningful support he got came from Zalmay
Khalilzad, then the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, who was briefed by Krepinevich
just before heading to Baghdad in June 2005. Despite Khalilzad's apparent
interest, the approach got no traction with administration war planners.

Khalilzad, now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, declined through a
spokesman to comment.

Failures prompt change

Turning over security to newly trained Iraqi forces remained the hallmark of
U.S. strategy in Iraq until early 2007. Army Gen. George Casey, who led
coalition forces in Iraq until February, often said the goal was to have
U.S. forces stand down as Iraqi forces stood up.

In June 2006, Kagan and three other military experts visited Camp David for
a meeting with the president's war Cabinet. Each took a turn addressing the
officials, who included Rumsfeld, Rice, national security adviser Stephen
Hadley, and Gen. Peter Pace, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Kagan's message - "We've got to do some counterinsurgency on these guys" -
didn't take.

Within weeks, the Pentagon launched "Operation Together Forward." Coalition
forces would "clear" an insurgent stronghold and Iraqi forces would "hold"
it. When Iraqi forces failed to hold, violence soared. After two months,
Maj. Gen. William Caldwell acknowledged that Together Forward had "not met
our overall expectations. "

In November 2006 - a day after Democrats won control of Congress - Bush
accepted the resignation of Rumsfeld, who had backed the stand-up,
stand-down strategy. Bush chose former CIA director Gates to replace him. By
December, the shift to a counterinsurgency strategy had begun.

Iraq was boiling over: 69 U.S. troops would be killed that December by IEDs,
the most IED deaths in any month since the war began. On Dec. 6, the Iraq
Study Group, a panel of military and political thinkers, issued a report
calling the Iraq situation "grave and deteriorating" and urging a phased
U.S. withdrawal.

The next Monday, Dec. 11, Bush met with retired generals and top military
analysts. One, retired Army general Jack Keane, pushed hard for a "surge" of
U.S. troops coupled with a secure-and-hold strategy for Baghdad and other
key areas.

Keane and other experts had developed the idea with Kagan, who was invited
to the White House later that week to meet with Hadley. It was one of
several strategy options, and the only one calling for a big increase in
U.S. troops. Keane and Kagan proved persuasive.

Even so, it took what Kagan calls "a perfect storm" to put it in place. The
deteriorating situation in Iraq, the grim report from the study group and
growing calls for U.S. withdrawal made the administration more flexible, he
says.

On Jan. 5, Bush chose Petraeus, who had finished writing the military's
counterinsurgency doctrine, to take charge in Iraq. Five days later, Bush
outlined a new strategy: "to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods .
protect the local population, and . ensure that the Iraqi forces . are
capable of providing" security.

It was precisely what his administration had rejected - and
counterinsurgency advocates had championed - for years.

4. Veteran's radio Show Today, online 6:30 to 8:30 PM

Posted by: "Colonel Dan" colonel-dan@sbcglobal.net coloneldan1

Wed Dec 19, 2007 8:22 am (PST)

Thanks Berta Simmons.. one of the experts I call on once in a while

<http://www.stardust ent.com/svr. htm> http://www.stardust ent.com/svr. htm

also 1690AM, Riverside, Iowa Between Davenport & DeMoines off I80

Veteran's in Nebraska & service officers need to read this and take action


<http://www.vawatchd og.org/07/ nf07/nfOCT07/ nf102507- 2.htm>
http://www.vawatchd og.org/07/ nf07/nfOCT07/ nf102507- 2.htm

From: BSim756679@aol. com
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2007 2:19 PM
To: VeteranIssues- owner@yahoogroup s.com
Subject: Re SVR Radio broadcast

http://www.stardust ent.com/ Podcast show chat room takes seconds to
download-but you can listen to the show with a media player without
downloading the Chat Star stuff---
toll free number 1-877-213-4329 for call in questions--- -

Please pass this on if you can- Col. Dan:

I am hosting the Dec 19th SVR (Surviving Veterans Resolve) show at 6:30 to
8:00 EST with Don Sandman.
Thanks, Berta Simmons (HadIt.com Veteran to Veteran LLC Guiding veterans through the VA disability claims process. - Home <http://www.hadit. com/> )


Our Special Guest tonight for the December 19th,2007 SVR broadcast is Don
Sandman, an Excellent County Service Officer who works for York County,
Nebraska.

Along with his proven track record of viable claims assistance to any vet or
widow who needs his help, Don also served in the USAF for 4 years and was
stationed at Utapao, Thailand ,Nov 72- Nov 73 and participated in LINEBACKER
II, the ops involving the bombing of Hanoi.

Also his extensive resume includes work in Law Enforcement, and he is a
Certified Emergency Medical Technician (saved a life), and for 10 years he
measured precipitation for the National Weather Service. He also held a
supervisory position with the city of Utica, Nebraska, and managed not only
an environmental company but also ran a chimney sweeping business and also
spent ten years working for a Fortune 500 aerospace plant.

IRONICALLY the fact that Don is a superb veteran's representative has cost
him employment problems with the county of York! We cannot ever get enough
excellent veteran's service officers and representatives as it is and this
problem has been a travesty and should never have happened. Larry Scott- VA
Watchdog published the whole story on this at

<http://www.vawatchd og.org/07/ nf07/nfOCT07/ nf102507- 2.htm>
http://www.vawatchd og.org/07/ nf07/nfOCT07/ nf102507- 2.htm

This should be a very interesting show! York County Nebraska
soscou17@nol. org http://www.yorkcoun ty.ne.gov/ index_html

Board of Commissioners

Kenneth Stuhr - Chairman
Augustus Brown JR
1406 Road U
1419 Blackburn Ave
Waco NE 68460
York NE 68467
(402)728-5340
(402)362-3692

Eugene Bergen - Vice Chairman Steve
Neujahr
208 Road G
918 Road N
Henderson NE 68371 York
NE 68467
(402)724-2465
(402)362-2306

Bob Wolfe
38 Eastridge Dr S
York NE 68467
(402)362-3460






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