The Unthinkable Consequences Of An Iran-israel Nuclear Exchange

[admin]

"THE UNTHINKABLE CONSEQUENCES OF AN IRAN-ISRAEL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE" By Anthony Cordesman forwarded with comments by EA Winston

"THE UNTHINKABLE CONSEQUENCES OF AN IRAN-ISRAEL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE" By Anthony Cordesman forwarded with comments by Emanuel A. Winston, Mid East Analyst & Commentator

The Cordesman analysis of a Nuclear exchange between Israel and her neighbors is reasonable - as far as it goes. However, behind Cordesman’s thinking, without stating it plainly, is the idea that other nations (even our friends) might wish to pre-empt and hit Israel so she could NOT respond to a Nuclear strike by Iran.
In which case, it would be prudent for Israel to float some cargo ships under foreign flag, into certain harbors, carrying nuclear devices. A warning would go out to such nations as Russia, among others, to the effect that it would be wise NOT to launch missiles at Israel from ships, submarines, aircraft or any other methods.
After Israel has responded to Iran and other Arab and/or Muslims countries, those ships would quietly leave those ports unless, of course, they too were vaporized.

COMMENTS BY EMANUEL A. WINSTON

###

# 818: Daniel Pipes Blog on "The Unthinkable Consequences of an Iran-Israel Nuclear Exchange by Anthony Cordesman

Anthony Cordesman, a strategist at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, has estimated the consequences if Tehran gets the bomb and a nuclear exchange with Israel ensues. He expects, writes Martin Walker of United Press International,

some 16 million to 28 million Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage.

It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes. The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1 megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get through.

Anthony Cordesman thinks the unthinkable.

Why such disparities in numbers? Because of differences in yield.

The biggest bomb that Iran is expected to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an air-burst of such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way, would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.)

Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3 Dolphin-class submarines.

The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin, Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. Israel would also likely target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground."

Further, Cordesman expects that Israel would need to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can capitalize on Iranian strike" and might target "key Arab neighbors"— Syria, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states in particular.

Israel would have various options, including a limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days; Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000 Israelis, but Israeli society would recover.

An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and almost certainly destroy the Aswan dam, sending monstrous floods down the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of Egypt as a functioning society.

Cordesman also lists the oil wells, refineries and ports along the Gulf that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow. Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the global economy.

Walker concludes that Cordesman's analysis spells out "the end of Persian civilization, quite probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age. This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty."
Comments: (1) Cordesman's projections continue the work of private individuals making available to the public what usually is the exclusive domain of intelligence services For another example pertaining to the Iranian nuclear program see the work of Whitney Raas and Austin Long, as summarized by me in "Israeli Jets vs. Iranian Nukes."
(2) If Cordesman's projections are at all accurate, they directly contradict the blithe assumptions of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former Iranian president, who asserted in December 2001, concerning an exchange of nuclear weapons with Israel:

If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel but the same thing would just produce minor damages in the Muslim world.

In other words, Rafsanjani was saying, an exchange would wipe out Israel's smaller population but leave Iran functioning. But Cordesman draws precisely the opposite conclusion. One hopes he is being heard by non-apocalyptic leaders in Tehran.
(3) Again, assuming his analysis is sound, the stakes in an Iran-Israel nuclear exchange are both far higher and of far more universal import (China, India, the global economy?) than usually imagined.
(4) Anyone still in favor of permitting the Iranians, who do have an apocalyptic leadership, to get nuclear weapons? (November 21, 2007)
# 818: Daniel Pipes Blog on "The Unthinkable Consequences of an Iran-Israel Nuclear Exchange by Anthony Cordesman