There's a whole philosophy of how to manage safety-critical software. So why...

[??? ?? ???????]

...isn't the philosophy followed ? Safety-critical software is managed by logging "change requests" and "actioning" the most appropriate of the change requests.

A pre-requisite is that the system be highly reliable, with very few faults.

I have noticed that some people decide to modify safety-critical software by making lots of changes, believing that the software development system can somehow handle all these changes.

But a pre-requisite for change is that the existing system has very few faults.

[QuiteNewHere]

They were all in cahoots.

[wisdomsteeth]

The safety critical software is not compatible with the popularised and majority of working systems. It is precisely the decomponents the safety critical software seeks to destroy that attempt to harness and feed from its power source.

System is highly reliable, and pro efficient, the exalted and hyped systems with a need to associate and elevate their present standing system are its greatest antibody.

A highly reliable, zero maintenance system, fully functional on a solar spectural system is liable to supercedeing by the manufacturer who has other avenues to maximise profit margins if only to bolster existing multi-commodity portfolio.